Panpsychism and the metaphysics of properties

A version of panpsychism emerges from a critical overview of the metaphysics of properties. The powerful qualities theory, which holds that all concrete properties are both powerful and qualitative, has a general advantage over other major property theories but faces the Collapse Argument: it struggles to define powerful qualities in a way that conceptually distinguishes them from pure powers. This issue is avoided by a variant making powerful qualities powerful qualia—essentially dispositional instances of phenomenal consciousness. Several attempts to sever the link between this powerful qualia theory and panpsychism are rejected. The endorsed result is a panpsychism of powerful qualia.

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Abstract

A version of panpsychism emerges from a critical overview of the metaphysics of properties. The “powerful qualities theory,” according to which all concrete properties are equiprimordially powerful and qualitative, enjoys a general advantage over other major theories of properties. But it faces some issues. Chief is the Collapse Argument: the powerful qualities theory struggles to define powerful qualities in a way that distinguishes them conceptually from pure powers. But this issue is avoided by a variant of the powerful qualities theory which makes powerful qualities “powerful qualia”: essentially dispositional instances of phenomenal consciousness. I reject a few attempts to sever the link between this powerful qualia theory of properties and panpsychism. The result, and the view I endorse, is a version of panpsychism: a panpsychism of powerful qualia.