ISSN 1469-1825
46 papers in the library · 2,236 citations · publishing 1998-2026
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Romain Brette
Integrated information theory postulates that a conscious experience depends on a repertoire of hypothetical experiences (the axiom of information). This makes consciousness depend on the context that constrains the set of possibilities and on the scenarios imagined by the external observer, and not only on the system itself.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Matteo Grasso et al.
The target article misrepresents the foundations of integrated information theory (IIT) and ignores many essential publications. It, thus, falls to this lead commentary to outline the axioms and postulates of IIT and correct major misconceptions. The commentary also explains why IIT starts from phenomenology and why it predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness....
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Paul Verschure
Integrated information theory (IIT) is an example of "ironic science" and obstructs the scientific study of consciousness. By confusing the ontological status of a method to quantify network complexity with that of a theory of consciousness, IIT has to square the circle and spirals toward its panpsychism conclusion. I analyze the consequences of this fallacy and suggest how the study of...
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Sarah L Eagleman, David M Eagleman, Vinod Menon et al.
Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf make several arguments against the integrated information theory of consciousness; whereas some have merit, their conclusion that the theory should be discarded is premature. Coming years promise advances in the empirical study of consciousness, and only after theories are independently tested with shared data can they be ruled in or out. We propose future...
The Behavioral and brain sciences May 19, 2021 Björn Merker, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf
Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's...
The Behavioral and brain sciences May 30, 2019 Samuel P. L. Veissière, Axel Constant, Maxwell J D Ramstead et al. 362 citations
The processes underwriting the acquisition of culture remain unclear. How are shared habits, norms, and expectations learned and maintained with precision and reliability across large-scale sociocultural ensembles? Is there a unifying account of the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of culture? Notions such as "shared expectations," the "selective patterning of attention and behaviour,"...
The Behavioral and brain sciences 2018 Shadab Tabatabaeian, Carolyn Dicey Jennings 7 citations
Singh's cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods of inducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting in profoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite different methods of induction, altered states of consciousness share neurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioral effects. This common foundation enables further cross-cultural...
The Behavioral and brain sciences 2018 Michael James Winkelman
Singh conflates diverse religious statuses into a single category that includes practitioners with roles that differ significantly from empirical characteristics of shamans. The rejection of biological models of trance and conspicuous display models misses the evolutionary roots of shamanism involving the social functions of ritual in producing psychological and social integration and ritual...
The Behavioral and brain sciences 2015 Tom Froese 14 citations
Pessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of...
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 2013 Jennifer Michelle Windt
Can ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles explain the function of dreaming? The analysis of self-experience in dreams suggests that the answer is no: The phenomenal dream self lacks certain dimensions that are crucial for the efficacy of AAOM in wakefulness. However, the comparison between dreams and AAOM may be fruitful by suggesting new perspectives for the study of lucid dreaming as well...
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 2013 Michael Schredl
The hypothesis that dreaming is involved in off-line memory processing is difficult to test because major methodological issues have to be addressed, such as dream recall and the effect of remembered dreams on memory. It would be fruitful--in addition to studying the ancient art of memory (AAOM) in a scanner--to study the dreams of persons who use AAOM regularly.
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 2007 Ned Block 1,123 citations
How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the...
The Behavioral and brain sciences October 1, 2004 Daniel M Wegner 247 citations
The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical...
The Behavioral and brain sciences October 1, 2004 Don Ross, David Spurrett
A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and...
The Behavioral and brain sciences April 1, 2004 Michael V Antony
Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term "consciousness." However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is...
The Behavioral and brain sciences August 2003 Steven Lehar
A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory....
The Behavioral and brain sciences June 2003 J David Smith, Wendy E Shields, David A Washburn
Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research...
The Behavioral and brain sciences October 1, 2001 K Oberauer
I argue that O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) theory is in a no better position than any other theory to solve the "hard problem" of consciousness. Getting rid of the explanatory gap by exchanging sensorimotor contingencies for neural representations is an illusion.
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 1999 S E Palmer
The relations among consciousness, brain behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke's "inverted spectrum argument" about the undetectability of color transformations. A symmetry analysis of color...
The Behavioral and brain sciences February 1, 1999 G O'Brien, J Opie
When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Consciousness is to be explained either in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys or in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of...
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 1998 L Pessoa, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë 435 citations
In visual science the term filling-in is used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies...