ISSN 1469-1825
41 papers in the library · 2,235 citations · publishing 1998-2026
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Hugh Desmond, Philippe Huneman
Measures of information integration may be more directly interpreted as measures of agency than of consciousness. Because agency and consciousness are duals in many respects, this reinterpretation could serve the goals of consciousness research.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Moshe Gur
Integrated information theory (IIT) equates consciousness with the amount of integrated information in a system, but conscious visual perception presents two counterexamples. First, objects are accurately perceived when presented for less than 100 milliseconds, a duration too brief for neural integration. Second, an object is seen as an integrated whole while its constituent details remain evident. Because integration destroys information about details, IIT cannot explain how perceptual details are preserved.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Paul Verschure
Integrated information theory (IIT) is characterized as an instance of 'ironic science' that hinders the scientific investigation of consciousness. The theory mistakenly treats a method for measuring network complexity as a full-fledged theory of consciousness, leading to an internal contradiction that drives it toward panpsychism. The author examines the implications of this conceptual error and proposes a path to return the study of consciousness to rational, empirical science.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Romain Brette
Integrated information theory claims that a conscious experience depends on a repertoire of hypothetical experiences, known as the axiom of information. This means that consciousness depends not only on the system itself but also on the context that constrains the set of possibilities and on scenarios imagined by an external observer.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Niccolò Negro
Integrated information theory (IIT) attempts to explain consciousness, but Merker and colleagues contend its formal structure does not align with subjective experience. This commentary argues that they do not fully clarify how IIT's postulates are derived from its axioms. A reformulated version of this problem is proposed, which could offer a new perspective on IIT's usefulness for studying consciousness.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Sarah L Eagleman, David M Eagleman, Vinod Menon et al.
A commentary on critiques of the integrated information theory of consciousness acknowledges that some arguments have merit but argues that discarding the theory entirely is premature. The authors expect advances in the empirical study of consciousness in coming years and assert that theories should be ruled in or out only after independent testing with shared data. They propose future research directions.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Cyriel M A Pennartz
A critical analysis of panpsychism argues that while integrated information theory could in principle apply to simple systems like photodiodes and subatomic particles, the main obstacle is the complete lack of evidence confirming consciousness in such entities. The perspectivalist theory of consciousness further illustrates the challenges in developing a comprehensive theory of consciousness.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Andrew M. Haun
The author argues that a critique of integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is mistaken, particularly regarding IIT's relationship to rigorous phenomenology and to the psychophysics of perception.
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Matteo Grasso et al.
Integrated information theory (IIT) begins with phenomenology and predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness. The theory's account of experience—a cause-effect structure quantified by integrated information—has nothing to do with information transfer. This commentary outlines IIT's axioms and postulates, correcting major misconceptions from a target article that misrepresents the theory's foundations and ignores essential publications.
The Behavioral and brain sciences May 19, 2021 Björn Merker, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf
Integrated information theory (IIT) proposes that consciousness is identical to integrated information, measured by phi (Φ). Analysis of the formal properties of Φ shows it actually measures the causal efficacy of differentiated networks in accomplishing global information transfer, not consciousness itself. This misidentification leads IIT to attribute consciousness to systems such as electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, electronic circuit boards, and social networks—a consequence the theory embraces, moving toward panpsychism. The cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT equates with consciousness performs a different function in humans. Recognizing this functional misattribution avoids a departure from science and offers lessons for research on consciousness from formal and neural perspectives.
The Behavioral and brain sciences January 1, 2018 Michael James Winkelman
The author argues that Singh incorrectly lumps together various religious practitioners under a single 'shaman' category, ignoring important differences in their roles. By dismissing biological models of trance and conspicuous display theories, Singh overlooks the evolutionary origins of shamanism, which lie in the social functions of ritual—namely, fostering psychological and social integration and enabling ritual healing.
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 2013 Jennifer Michelle Windt
The ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles, which rely on spatial and emotional cues to enhance recall, do not explain the function of dreaming because the phenomenal dream self lacks crucial dimensions needed for AAOM's effectiveness during wakefulness. Nonetheless, comparing dreams to AAOM may offer new insights for studying lucid dreaming and for reconsidering how AAOM itself works.
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 2013 Michael Schredl
Testing whether dreaming contributes to memory consolidation during sleep faces major methodological hurdles, including how dream recall itself affects memory. One promising approach is to study the dreams of individuals who regularly practice the ancient art of memory (AAOM), alongside neuroimaging studies of AAOM practitioners. This line of research could help clarify the relationship between dreaming and off-line memory processing.
The Behavioral and brain sciences October 1, 2004 Don Ross, David Spurrett
A recent metaphysical critique argues that functionalism in cognitive science—the view that mental states are defined by what they do rather than by their physical makeup—makes mental processes epiphenomenal (causally impotent) and that reductionism is needed to restore causal significance. The authors contend that returning to reductionism would devastate cognitive and behavioral sciences by invalidating most existing work and imposing unworkable constraints. They further argue that the metaphysical challenge fails because it reifies two distinct notions of causality (scientific and metaphysical) and equivocates between them. Once these notions are properly distinguished, functionalism faces no serious philosophical threat, and the choice between reducing minds or accepting causal impotence is false. The critique relies on a naïve view of physics and its relation to metaphysics.
The Behavioral and brain sciences October 1, 2001 K Oberauer
The author argues that O'Regan and Noë's sensorimotor theory of consciousness does not solve the hard problem of consciousness any better than other theories. Replacing neural representations with sensorimotor contingencies merely creates an illusion of closing the explanatory gap, but does not actually address why or how physical processes give rise to subjective experience.
The Behavioral and brain sciences December 1, 1999 S E Palmer
An analysis of color perception examines whether one person's color experience could be inverted relative to another's without detection, as proposed by Locke's inverted spectrum argument. A symmetry analysis of color space shows that reversing the experience of a rainbow would not work, but three other color-to-color transformations might, depending on the relevance of certain color categories. The analysis leads to an "isomorphism constraint" that distinguishes what can and cannot be determined about color experience through objective behavioral means. Within-subject designs using biological interventions hold the greatest promise for scientific progress on consciousness, but objective knowledge of another person's experience appears impossible.