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Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind.

Tom Froese

The Behavioral and brain sciences January 1, 2015 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x14000892 (opens in new tab) via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Pessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) offers an integrative neuroscience approach that aligns with enactivism, a cognitive science framework. Both perspectives treat complexity as central to mind and tightly link perception, cognition, and emotion—enactivism does so through its core concept of sense-making. They also argue that mental processes extend spatially beyond specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connections. An enactive neuroscience is now developing.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 14
Key finding Argues that Pessoa's integrative neuroscience and enactivism converge on complexity, tight integration of perception, cognition, and emotion, and the spatial extension of mental processes beyond specific brain regions, pointing to an emerging enactive neuroscience.

Abstract

Pessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.

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