Consciousness as a Cross-Section? Edwin B. Holt's Externalism and Samuel Alexander's Critique of It
Matthias Neuber
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy October 21, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781042011384-13 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Samuel Alexander's critique of Edwin B. Holt's externalist, 'cross-section' account of consciousness was well-founded but limited in its intended function as a contribution to the neorealist viewpoint as such, and suggests that American 'critical' realism was the more promising position in that context. |
Abstract
In his The Concept of Consciousness (1914), Edwin B. Holt advocated an externalism according to which consciousness is not located “in the head” but is to be regarded as a “cross-section” at the interface of the neural system and its environment. This approach formed part of a comprehensive “neorealism,” which was also defended by Samuel Alexander. However, Alexander did not agree with Holt’s approach to consciousness. In the following, Holt’s position and Alexander’s critique of it will be concisely reviewed and, to some extent, contextualized. I shall point out that Alexander’s critique was well-founded but at the same time limited in its intended function as a contribution to the neorealist viewpoint as such. Furthermore, it is suggested that American “critical” realism was the more promising position in the given context.