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At the Dawn of Asubjective Phenomenology

Riccardo Paparusso

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy October 21, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781042011384-21 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Patočka's 1931 dissertation contains an autonomous phenomenological theory built on two elements: a non-transcendental, finite consciousness whose temporality derives from a more original duration of life (Bergson's "vital impulse"), and an account of the origin of manifestation that coincides with that same "vital impulse."

Abstract

This chapter aims to reconstruct the autonomous phenomenological theory that Patočka subtly articulates in his 1931 dissertation The Concept of Evidence and Its Significance for Noetics . This proposal is based on two fundamental elements: the first consists of a non-transcendental phenomenological consciousness, which is finite because its temporality derives from a duration more original than that of consciousness—the duration of life, specifically the “vital impulse” discussed by Bergson in Creative Evolution . The second element concerns the origin of manifestation, which coincides precisely with the “vital impulse,” that vital–biological current that spreads incessantly through the infinite multiplicity of organisms.

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