Liminal Phenomena. A Phenomenological Investigation. Editors' Introduction
Valeria Bizzari, Stefano Micali
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy October 21, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781042011384-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that phenomenology must confront two distinct but connected issues: phenomena that escape direct intuition and intentional consciousness, and the broader question of whether such limit-phenomena are merely anomalous exceptions or instead require transforming the concept of phenomenology by challenging the constitutive link between phenomenality and intentionality. |
Abstract
Approaching the question of limit-phenomena within phenomenology is not an easy task. For this reason, it seems appropriate, from a systematic point of view, to introduce a distinction that concerns two closely interrelated issues, which nonetheless deserve to be treated separately. The first concerns the analysis of specific phenomena that escape direct intuition and elude intentional consciousness—in a literal sense, they are unconscious. The second issue, intimately connected to the first, nevertheless poses a broader “architectural” problem for phenomenology as such. Once we have identified and described phenomena that exist in tension with the intentional regime, what is the impact of these phenomena on phenomenology itself? Are such limit-phenomena to be regarded merely as anomalous exceptions—deviations of no intrinsic significance? Or do they compel a transformation of the very concept of phenomenology by calling into question the constitutive relation between phenomenality and intentionality?