ISSN 2699-0369
57 papers in the library · 576 citations · publishing 2020-2026
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences July 19, 2021 Sascha Benjamin Fink, Ying-Tung Lin
This paper introduces the second part of a special issue on the neural correlates of consciousness, examining progress and paradigms in consciousness science from a philosophy of science perspective.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences July 19, 2021 Tobias Schlicht, Krzysztof Dołęga
The predictive processing framework, popular in mind and brain research, is unlikely to deliver major breakthroughs in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness because it is too vague to pinpoint neural mechanisms at a fine scale. Despite its unifying goals, the framework includes diverse computational models with different assumptions that are under-constrained by neurological data. Additionally, it is ill suited as a unifying theory of consciousness, as attempts to explain consciousness within it rely heavily on external assumptions, despite claims of compatibility with leading neuroscientific models.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences July 19, 2021 Morten Overgaard, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are often used as evidence for or against competing conceptual theories of the mind, but this is an overestimation of what NCC findings can do. There is neither an isomorphism nor a homomorphism between the conceptual frameworks of these theories and the data obtained from neuroimaging. Consequently, neural activation profiles alone cannot distinguish between competing theories. Two approaches are suggested to address this issue.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences December 30, 2020 Sascha Benjamin Fink
This special issue marks 30 years since the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) research program was revived and 20 years since the standard definition of an NCC was published. The authors examine conceptual, methodological, and empirical questions that have arisen and assess how the field has evolved over that period.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences December 30, 2020 Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) concept, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, conflates content-related processing with the neural substrate that makes perceptual contents conscious. This paper proposes splitting the perceptual NCC into two distinct subnotions to clarify the distinction. Arguments are presented for this reconceptualization, along with its potential advantages for ongoing methodological debates in consciousness research.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020 Sascha Benjamin Fink
People sometimes claim to have had experiences in which they were conscious but felt no sense of self. Some philosophers argue that such reports are self-defeating because the reporter implicitly affirms their own existence as a witness to the experience, contradicting the claim that no self was present. This paper examines that argument and finds it too strong. Self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences can arise for several reasons, only some of which involve an actual change in consciousness. Among those that do, only one—total ego-dissolution—is logically incoherent; other possibilities, such as an expansion of the felt self, do not lead to contradictions. The author concludes that the most plausible explanation for such reports is not the disappearance of a felt self but its expansion.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020 Miguel Ángel Sebastián
A minimal form of self-awareness—Perspectival First-Person Awareness (PFP-Awareness)—is a non-conceptual, identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for conscious experience. Contrary to claims that altered states such as those induced by psychedelics, meditation, or dreams disrupt this minimal self-awareness, the evidence does not support its absence. While some typical forms of self-awareness may be compromised, PFP-Awareness remains intact. Reports suggesting a radical disruption likely stem from confirmation bias, influenced by subjects' expectations and metaphysical views, and should be mistrusted.