Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
April 19, 2022
Chris Letheby
3 citations
In this précis I summarise the main ideas of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics. The book discusses philosophical issues arising from the therapeutic use of “classic” (serotonergic) psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and LSD. The book is organised around what I call the Comforting Delusion Objection to psychedelic therapy: the concern that this novel and promising treatment relies essentially...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
April 19, 2022
Matthew Johnson
I highly recommend Philosophy of Psychedelics by Chris Letheby (2021) to both the public and academics who want to dig deeper into the modern therapeutic science of psychedelics. In this piece, I will draw attention to key topics covered in the book that I judge as particularly compelling and likely to influence psychedelic therapy and our understanding of it going forward. Clearly, the...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
January 25, 2022
Chiara Caporuscio
9 citations
Chris Letheby’s defence of psychedelic therapy hinges on the premise that psychedelic-facilitated insights about the self are in a better epistemic position than those about the external world. In this commentary, I argue that such a claim is not sufficiently defended. More precisely, I argue that one element is underexplored in Letheby’s otherwise compelling picture: namely, that unlike new...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 19, 2021
Sascha Benjamin Fink, Ying-Tung Lin
An introduction to the second part of the special issue celebrating the neural correlates of consciousness. Here, we focus on progress and paradigms in the science of consciousness from the perspective of philosophy of science.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 19, 2021
Sascha Benjamin Fink, Lukas Kob, Holger Lyre
Researchers on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) need to distinguish mere statistical NCCs from NCCs proper. Some neural events may be co-occurrent, probabilistically coupled, or coincidental with a type of conscious experience but lack any deeper connection to it, while in other cases, the relation between neural states and a type of experience hints at a strong metaphysical...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 19, 2021
Morten Overgaard, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Subjective experience has often taken center stage in debates between competing conceptual theories of the mind. This is also a central object of concern in the empirical domain, and especially in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). By now, most of the competing conceptual theories of consciousness have become aligned with distinct hypotheses about the NCCs. These...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 19, 2021
Tobias Schlicht, Krzysztof Dołęga
The predictive processing framework has gained significant popularity across disciplines investigating the mind and brain. In this article we critically examine two of the recently made claims about the kind of headway that the framework can make in the neuroscientific and philosophical investigation of consciousness. Firstly, we argue that predictive processing is unlikely to yield significant...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
April 15, 2021
Remington Mallett, Michelle Carr, Martin Freegard et al.
7 citations
Dream lucidity, or being aware that one is dreaming while dreaming, is not an all-or-none phenomenon. Often, subjects report being some variant of “a little lucid” as opposed to completely or not at all. As recent neuroimaging work begins to elucidate the neural underpinnings of lucid experience, understanding subtle phenomenological variation within lucid dreams is essential. Here, we focus on...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
December 30, 2020
Jakob Hohwy, Anil K. Seth
162 citations
The search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of a systematic, principled foundation that can endow putative neural correlates with greater predictive and explanatory value. Here, we propose the predictive processing framework for brain function as a promising candidate for providing this systematic foundation. The proposal is motivated by that framework’s ability to address...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
December 30, 2020
C. Klein, Jakob Hohwy, Tim Bayne
54 citations
At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (the NCCs). One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
December 30, 2020
Andy Mckilliam
28 citations
The notion of a global state (or level) of consciousness is an increasingly important construct in the science of consciousness. However, exactly what a global state of consciousness is remains poorly understood. In this paper I offer an account of global states of consciousness as consciousness-related capacity modulations. On this view global states are not themselves phenomenal states – they...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
December 30, 2020
Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák
The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
December 30, 2020
Sascha Benjamin Fink
This special issue celebrates the double anniversary of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs): 30 years since the research programme for finding neural correlates of consciousness was brought back onto the scientific agenda and 20 years since the standard definition of an NCC was published in a seminal anthology. Here, we take up some of the conceptual, methodological, and empirical...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
March 24, 2020
Thomas Metzinger
133 citations
This is the first in a series of instalments aiming at a minimal model explanation for conscious experience, taking the phenomenal character of “pure consciousness” or “pure awareness” in meditation as its entry point. It develops the concept of “minimal phenomenal experience” (MPE) as a candidate for the simplest form of consciousness, substantiating it by extracting six semantic constraints...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
March 24, 2020
George Deane
48 citations
Psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin, LSD and DMT are known to induce powerful alterations in phenomenology. Perhaps of most philosophical and scientific interest is their capacity to disrupt and even “dissolve” one of the most primary features of normal experience: that of being a self. Such “peak” or “mystical” experiences are of increasing interest for their potentially transformative...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
March 24, 2020
Raphaël Millière
47 citations
Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
March 24, 2020
Chris Letheby
18 citations
Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” (SP) faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
March 24, 2020
Miguel Ángel Sebastián
It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
March 24, 2020
Sascha Benjamin Fink
How to model non-egoic experiences – mental events with phenomenal aspects that lack a felt self – has become an interesting research question. The main source of evidence for the existence of such non-egoic experiences are self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences. In these, a person says about herself that she underwent an episode where she was conscious but lacked a feeling of self. Some...