Look who's talking! Varieties of ego-dissolution without paradox
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.40 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Ego dissolution |
| Key points | Argues that self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences are not necessarily self-defeating; the most plausible change is an expansion rather than disappearance of the felt self. |
Abstract
How to model non-egoic experiences – mental events with phenomenal aspects that lack a felt self – has become an interesting research question. The main source of evidence for the existence of such non-egoic experiences are self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences. In these, a person says about herself that she underwent an episode where she was conscious but lacked a feeling of self. Some interpret these as accurate reports, but this is questionable. Thomas Metzinger (2004, p. 566, 2018), Rocco Gennaro (2008), and Charles Foster (2016, p. 6) have hinted at the self-defeating nature of such statements if we take them to be genuine reports: Apparently, the reporter (a) explicitly denies her existence during the selfless experience, but (b) implicitly affirms her existence as a witness to that selfless experience in order to give a first-person report about it. So the content of such a report conflicts with the pragmatics of reporting. If all self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences are self-defeating in this way, then they cannot count as evidence for the existence of non-egoic experiences. Here, I map out why such strong conclusions do not directly follow: What look like self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences may occur for a number of reasons. Only some explanations for such utterances rely on a change in consciousness. Of those that do rely on a change in consciousness, only one (total ego-dissolution) is incoherent. But its alternatives do not lead to contradictions. I argue that the most likely change in phenomenality that leads to self-ascriptions of non-egoic experiences is not one where a felt self disappears, but where it expands.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on ego dissolution, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Ethics and ego dissolution: the case of psilocybin | 2020 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Mystical and Other Alterations in Sense of Self: An Expanded Framework for Studying Nonordinary Experiences | 2020 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Psychedelic medicalization, public discourse, and the morality of ego dissolution | 2021 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 11
- The varieties of selflessness Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020
- The ego in psychedelic drug action – ego defenses, ego boundaries, and the therapeutic role of regression Frontiers in Neuroscience October 6, 2023
- Philosophy and classic psychedelics: A review of some emerging themes Journal of Psychedelic Studies January 21, 2022
- Being for no-one Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020
- The Technology of Awakening: Experiments in Zen Phenomenology Religions March 13, 2021
and 6 more in the library