Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences December 30, 2020 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.61 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) concept, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, conflates content-related processing with the neural substrate that makes perceptual contents conscious. This paper proposes splitting the perceptual NCC into two distinct subnotions to clarify the distinction. Arguments are presented for this reconceptualization, along with its potential advantages for ongoing methodological debates in consciousness research.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for perceptual episodes mixes content-related processing with the substrate of consciousness proper, and proposes dividing the perceptual NCC into two subnotions. |
Abstract
The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The paper elaborates the distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and sketches advantages of the proposed reconceptualization.