Prediction error minimization: Implications for Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.
Brain and Cognition March 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.bandc.2016.01.009 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Embodied cognition Extended mind hypothesis Prediction error minimization |
| Key points | Argues that clarifying the theoretical motivations behind Clark's and Hohwy's competing interpretations of PEM can help adjudicate between their views on Embodied and Extended cognition. |
Abstract
Over the past few years, the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework has increasingly been gaining ground throughout the cognitive sciences. A key issue dividing proponents of PEM is how we should conceptualize the relation between brain, body and environment. Clark advocates a version of PEM which retains, at least to a certain extent, his prior commitments to Embodied Cognition and to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Hohwy, by contrast, presents a sustained argument that PEM actually rules out at least some versions of Embodied and Extended cognition. The aim of this paper is to facilitate a constructive debate between these two competing alternatives by explicating the different theoretical motivations underlying them, and by homing in on the relevant issues that may help to adjudicate between them.