Prediction error minimization: Implications for Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.

The prediction error minimization (PEM) framework is gaining influence across cognitive sciences. A central debate concerns how PEM conceptualizes the relationship between brain, body, and environment. Clark argues for a version of PEM that retains commitments to Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Hohwy contends that PEM rules out at least some versions of Embodied and Extended cognition. This paper aims to facilitate constructive debate by explicating the different theoretical motivations underlying these two alternatives and identifying relevant issues that may help adjudicate between them.

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Abstract

Over the past few years, the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework has increasingly been gaining ground throughout the cognitive sciences. A key issue dividing proponents of PEM is how we should conceptualize the relation between brain, body and environment. Clark advocates a version of PEM which retains, at least to a certain extent, his prior commitments to Embodied Cognition and to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Hohwy, by contrast, presents a sustained argument that PEM actually rules out at least some versions of Embodied and Extended cognition. The aim of this paper is to facilitate a constructive debate between these two competing alternatives by explicating the different theoretical motivations underlying them, and by homing in on the relevant issues that may help to adjudicate between them.