Predictive processing (PP) accounts often characterize mental illness as maladaptive and epistemically distorting due to mismatches between brain-generated top-down models and bottom-up sensory inputs, with this review identifying exceptions. First, hypervigilance in trauma survivors with PTSD or depression may sustain desirable gaps between anticipated problems and actual harms that would...
Despite historical shifts, “science” has consistently meant epistemic authority, perhaps leading enactivists to cast their work accordingly. Yet enactivism sits uneasily with Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian paradigm shifts, Hempel’s standards, and other philosophy of science benchmarks, but does better under Lakatos. Lakatos’s model holds that progressive science preserves a hardcore of...
This article examines William James’s philosophy of science through his pragmatic response to epistemic fallibilism, emphasizing how actionability rather than evidential certainty underwrites both scientific and religious practices. While James explicitly drew comparisons between science and Abrahamic scriptures, my account highlights resonances with non-Western traditions, particularly...
A widely cited roadblock to bridging ecological psychology and enactivism is that the former identifies with realism and the latter identifies with constructivism, which critics charge is subjectivist. A pragmatic reading, however, suggests non-mental forms of constructivism that simultaneously fit core tenets of enactivism and ecological realism. After advancing a pragmatic version of enactive...