Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism: Reply to Hutto.
Martin Weichold, Zuzanna Rucińska
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-022-09841-7 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that the praxeological enactivist account of pretense has crucial advantages over the radical enactivist alternative proposed by Hutto. |
Abstract
In his recent paper "Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal", Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.