This article explores the notion of first-person authority (FPA) in self-disorders (SD). It will be argued that the ‘ipseity disturbance model’ (IDM) of SD cannot account for the FPA of reports of disturbed mineness in SD. Moreover, it will be argued that the phenomenological account of a ‘loss of common sense’ - typically coupled with the IDM - cannot account for the FPA of reports of...
An important feature of contemporary phenomenological psychopathology is the development of explanatory accounts, constructed at the level of first-person experience, for why certain phenomena appear in a psychiatric condition. Termed phenomenological explanation, this approach to explanation is intended to uniquely contribute to diagnostic classification and etiology. Despite its promise for...
In the past three decades, psychiatric research has increasingly focused on the early subthreshold stages of psychosis, with the aim of improving the early identification and treatment of individuals at increased risk of psychotic disorder. Yet, despite considerable research effort, current early psychosis research faces several limitations. In this Personal View, we consider how integrating...
Dynamical systems theory (DST) has recently gained traction as a framework to describe and predict the progression of psychopathology. However, a number of challenges to the application of DST to psychopathology have arisen, including the heterogeneity of symptom measures and the lack of theoretical underpinnings to describe the temporal unfolding of psychiatric illnesses. In this article, we...
Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or ‘minimal self’. In this paper, we first highlight some...
In the present essay, we aim to develop an expressivist reading of the phenomenon of first-person authority and the adverbial meaning of unconsciousness. In the first part, Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks on the asymmetry between the first –and third-persons in psychological self-ascriptions are developed as an alternative to detectivist explanations according to which first-person authority...
In the present essay, we aim to develop and contrast three different positions toward Sellars' distinction between the manifest and scientific images of man: Dennett's philosophical reconstruction of neurocognitive science, contemporary phenomenology and psychoanalysis. We will suggest that these respective traditions and the substantial differences between them can be understood in terms of a...