Expression and the Unconscious
Jasper Feyaerts, Stijn Vanheule
Frontiers in Psychology December 12, 2017 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02162 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that first-person authority is best understood expressivistically, following Wittgenstein's remarks on the asymmetry between first- and third-person self-ascriptions, rather than as an epistemic accomplishment. Proposes that unconsciousness should be analyzed non-epistemically, as something the speaker seems unable to do, and rejects the view that the concept of the unconscious requires a Cartesian 'subject of the unconscious' or can be deduced from paradoxes of first-personal reference. |
Abstract
In the present essay, we aim to develop an expressivist reading of the phenomenon of first-person authority and the adverbial meaning of unconsciousness. In the first part, Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks on the asymmetry between the first –and third-persons in psychological self-ascriptions are developed as an alternative to detectivist explanations according to which first-person authority is to be regarded as a matter of epistemic accomplishment. In the second part, this expressivist account will be used to propose a non-epistemic analysis of the meaning of unconsciousness. Along the way, a critical discussion will be offered of both Freud’s and Lacan’s respective readings of the unconscious. Regarding the latter, we will reject the idea that the concept of the unconscious (i) necessitates the introduction of a (Cartesian) ‘subject of the unconscious’ and (ii) could be deduced from the paradoxes of first-personal reference. In our conclusion, we outline an alternative conception of unconsciousness as not being a matter of something which I qua epistemic subject fail to acknowledge, but of something which I qua speaker seem unable to do.