3 papers in the library · 57 citations · publishing 2003-2011
Philosophical Topics 2011 Robert Hanna 9 citations
Precisely how and precisely where is human conscious experience located in the natural world? The Extended Conscious Mind Thesis says this: The constitutive mechanisms of human conscious experience include both extra-neural bodily facts and also extra-bodily worldly facts. Recently, in “Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness Is (Probably) Still in the Head,” Andy Clark has argued...
January 8, 2009 Robert Hanna, Michelle L. Maiese
Abstract Similarly, Chalmers says that ‘‘a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel — an associated quality of experience.’’ So phenomenal consciousnessƖ௦ is the subjective qualitative feel of a mental state. We agree with Chalmers and Nagel that subjective qualitative feel is a necessary and sufficient condition of consciousnessƖ௦. But we also strongly disagree with Chalmers and...
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 2003 Robert Hanna, Evan Thompson 48 citations
Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Nagel1980, p. 150). My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed (Nagel1998, p. 338). Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable...