ConsciousnessƖ௦ and Essential Embodiment II: Types and Structures
Robert Hanna, Michelle L. Maiese
January 8, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199230310.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that subjective qualitative feel, while necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, is only one embedded aspect of subjective experience and cannot be neurophenomenologically or metaphysically detached from a larger set of factors; rejects the view that it is the sole or unique condition of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract Similarly, Chalmers says that ‘‘a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel — an associated quality of experience.’’ So phenomenal consciousnessƖ௦ is the subjective qualitative feel of a mental state. We agree with Chalmers and Nagel that subjective qualitative feel is a necessary and sufficient condition of consciousnessƖ௦. But we also strongly disagree with Chalmers and Nagel if they are further claiming, or at least implying, that phenomenal consciousnessƖ௦ is the solely or uniquely necessary and sufficient condition of consciousnessƖ௦ — for we hold that subjective qualitative feel is only one aspect of subjective experience, and indeed an aspect that is fully embedded, in the sense that it cannot be either neurophenomenologically or metaphysically detached from a much larger and essentially richer set of factors.