Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 2003 DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2003.10717597 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 48 |
| Key points | Argues that the mind-body problem's intractability stems from inadequate concepts and that mind is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the brain's metastable dynamic patterns. |
Abstract
Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Nagel1980, p. 150). My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed (Nagel1998, p. 338). Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain (Kelso 1995, p. 288).