A Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive processing proposes that beliefs serve as a central hub linking phenomenology, behavior, and neural dynamics. Under the assumption that phenomenology is a function of beliefs, the authors derive mathematical predictions for subjective similarity judgments, cognitive metabolic cost, subjective cognitive effort, and time perception. They review the connection between beliefs and neural dynamics to complete a generative passage for neurophenomenology, omitting the belief–behavior link as already documented. Testing these predictions will inform the validity of the central assumption and advance the neurophenomenology research program.
A Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive processing proposes that beliefs serve as a central hub linking phenomenology, behavior, and neural dynamics. If phenomenology is a function of beliefs, then specific predictions follow for subjective similarity judgments, cognitive metabolic cost, subjective cognitive effort, and time perception. The connection between beliefs and neural dynamics completes the generative passage for neurophenomenology, while the belief-behavior link is already well-documented. Testing these predictions will inform the validity of the central assumption and advance the neurophenomenology research program.