Fenomenologia in "prima" e in "terza" persona: Searle e Dennett critici di Husserl
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 29, 2014 Federica Buongiorno
Searle and Dennett each reinterpreted Husserl's concept of intentionality, transforming it into a third-person model of description. This shift creates problematic consequences: it blurs the distinction between a mental act and its content, undermines the representational theory of mind, targets the Cartesian Theater and Homunculus arguments, and rejects the notion of the Unconscious. Both positions stem from a contradictory reductionism also present in naturalized phenomenology and neurophenomenology. These difficulties cannot be resolved by adapting phenomenology to cognitive science or returning to Husserl. Instead, specific problems such as the temporal structure of consciousness and unconscious mental contents should be addressed phenomenologically within a scientific context.