From the Extended Mind to the Digitally Extended Self: A Phenomenological Critique

The paper critically examines Clark and Chalmers' extended mind hypothesis to develop a phenomenological account of active externalism. It first situates the hypothesis within Herbert Simon's physical symbol system framework, then connects the extended mind to the concept of the extended self, particularly in digital contexts. The author argues that externalist theories have neglected the explanatory role of the human body and its relationship to the mind, which a phenomenological perspective can address. The goal is to demonstrate that phenomenology offers a missing theoretical foundation for a more comprehensive theory of the digitally extended self.

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Abstract

In this paper, I will critically consider Clark and Chalmers’ hypothesis of the «extended mind» in order to sketch a possible phenomenological account of active externalism, by following three steps: (i) I will consider Clark and Chalmers’ hypothesis within the broader context of the so-called «physical symbol system hypothesis» theorized by Herbert A. Simon; (ii) I will connect the problem of the «extended mind» to that of the «extended self», with particular regard to the context of digitalization; (iii) I will take into account an explanatory dimension that has been fundamentally underrated by externalist theories: the dimension of the human body and its relationship to mind, which I understand from a phenomenological perspective. My ultimate goal is to show how phenomenology could provide the missing theoretical framework to develop a more complex and comprehensive theory of the (digitally) extended self.