The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: a difference it makes for psychological functioning.
T Natsoulas
The American Journal of Psychology 1997 DOI: 10.2307/1423408 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Humans Awareness Consciousness Perception Psychological theory |
| Key points | Argues that many states in William James's stream of consciousness are perceptual mental acts whose contents include 'phenomenological perceptual presence'—the presentation of environmental objects themselves rather than mere internal representations—and that this presence plays a functional role, since people often base their next actions toward a perceived object on its phenomenological perceptual presence. |
Abstract
Of the states that constitute William James's stream of consciousness, many are or include perceptual mental acts. These states present to consciousness one or more of their environmental objects themselves, as distinct from a mere internal representation of the latter. That is, a feature of the contents of such states is that their objects have phenomenological perceptual presence. Furthermore, this presence plays a role in mental functioning, beyond simply its being instantiated by many states of consciousness: We often base what we do next with respect to an environmental object that we perceive on its phenomenological perceptual presence to us.