From visual sensations to the seen-now and the seen-from-here.
T Natsoulas
Psychological Research 1989 DOI: 10.1007/bf00309302 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Gibson's late proposal that we can become aware of the "seen-now" and "seen-from-here" as such implies a kind of inner awareness of experiential effects, and contends that Gibson's ecological account must therefore either return to visual sensations or include visual-perspectival appearances that normally pass unnoticed during perception. |
Abstract
If, as Gibson last proposed, we become aware (in the introspective attitude during visual perceiving) of the seen-now and the seen-from-here as such, there must occur not only outer awareness of these surfaces, but also a kind of inner awareness of certain of their experiential effects upon us. From Gibson's perspective, this conclusion would seem to mean that his ecological account must return, in this context, to visual sensations; or preferably it must include visual-perspectival appearances proceeding normally unnoticed in the stream of consciousness during visual perception of the environment.