Integrated information theory (IIT) claims that consciousness arises from a system's ability to integrate information. This paper examines IIT's theoretical structure, specifically how its phenomenological axioms relate to its ontological postulates. The author identifies an unclear link between the exclusion axiom and the exclusion postulate, and argues that the exclusion postulate creates a qualia underdetermination problem—meaning the theory cannot uniquely determine the quality of conscious experience. The paper proposes answers to three questions: how the exclusion axiom leads to the exclusion postulate, how that postulate causes the underdetermination problem, and whether a solution exists. If successful, these proposals would strengthen IIT's theoretical foundation and practical application.
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes that consciousness arises from a physical system's capacity to integrate information, and that the fundamental properties of experience can be analyzed through such informational properties. This article critically appraises IIT, tracing its theoretical evolution and mathematical modeling over the last decade, while highlighting key controversies and intra-model issues. The authors examine major transitions in the theory and present extra-model problems with its principles. They conclude that for future development, IIT should more seriously consider metacognitive accessibility to experience.
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes that consciousness arises from a system's capacity to integrate information. This critical review traces the theory's evolution, highlighting advances in its mathematical framework and persistent controversies. The authors outline fundamental IIT concepts, discuss major theoretical transitions and intra-model problems, and present extra-model issues concerning the theory's principles. They conclude that future development of IIT should more seriously incorporate metacognitive accessibility to experience.