3 papers in the library · 46 citations · publishing 2004-2018
Journal of Social Philosophy March 1, 2018 Philip N. Pettit 46 citations
Thomas Nagel (1979, Ch 12) introduced the topic of consciousness to contemporary philosophical debate, arguing that a mental state is conscious when, in an intuitive sense, there is something it is like for the subject to instantiate it.1 The question
January 22, 2009 Philip N. Pettit
Abstract This chapter sketches what is considered the best interpretation of physicalism, rehearses the best way of defending it, and shows that the physicalism forthcoming is still going to be less than fully satisfying; it is going to leave us short of the satisfaction that might be expected from a philosophical theory. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section gives an...
Mind, Morality, and Explanation February 19, 2004 Frank Jackson, Philip N. Pettit
Abstract: Causation has come to play an increasingly important role in the philosophy of mind, reaching its apotheosis in the doctrine that to be a mental state of kind K is to fill the causal role definitive of that kind of mental state: the typology of mental states is a typology of causal roles. However, ironically, there is, from this very functionalist perspective, a problem about how to...