Causation in the Philosophy of Mind
Frank Jackson, Philip N. Pettit
Mind, Morality, and Explanation February 19, 2004 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that functionalism, which defines mental states by their causal roles, faces a problem in accounting for the causal role of mental properties. This problem surfaces in debates over the language of thought, the explanatory relevance of broad content, and the eliminativist implications of connectionism. |
Abstract
Abstract: Causation has come to play an increasingly important role in the philosophy of mind, reaching its apotheosis in the doctrine that to be a mental state of kind K is to fill the causal role definitive of that kind of mental state: the typology of mental states is a typology of causal roles. However, ironically, there is, from this very functionalist perspective, a problem about how to understand the causal role of mental properties, those properties which make a mental state the kind of mental state that it is. This problem surfaces in one way or another in the debates over the language of thought (for instance, in the argument that only if intentional states have syntactic00ADlike structure can they play the required causal roles); over the explanatory role of broad content (for instance, in the argument that broad content is explanatorily irrelevant to behaviour because doppelgangers behave alike while possibly differing in broad content); and over the eliminativist implications of connectionism (for instance, in the argument that certain versions of connectionism falsify the propositional modularity component of the folk conception of the causes of behaviour).
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