3 papers in the library · publishing 2010
October 31, 2010 Dimitris Platchias
EXPERIENCE AND CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE Once upon a time in philosophy, it was thought that one's knowledge of one's own current mental states is infallible. Thoughts, and mental states in general, were thought to be transparent to the thinker, that is, nothing can be in my mind without my knowing that it is there, whereas, say, my body is not transparent to me in the same sense. It was held...
October 31, 2010 Dimitris Platchias
QUALIA Imagine the best slice of pizza in the world: New York-style size, two thin and crispy crusts, with melted provolone and cheddar cheese, pizza sauce and toppings in between. Imagine you bite into the slice and taste its deliciousness. What is the underlying mechanism that enables you to taste the pizza? Contemporary neuroscience tells us that taste is a function of the central nervous...
October 31, 2010 Dimitris Platchias
HIGHER-ORDER REPRESENTATIONALISM In the previous chapters we saw that there is good reason to think that mental qualitative properties are explanatorily irrelevant to experience or what-it-is-likeness. Further, we cannot come up with the required explanation for experience by appealing to any number of physical properties of neural states. Thus we should attempt a different explanatory...