Abstract In his book Phenomenology of Perception, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty first coined the phrase “motor intentionality.” At the same time he highlighted the contrast between motor and cognitive intentionality, he also emphasized their generally smooth interplay in normal agents. An account of motor intentionality should thus aim at elucidating not just what distinguishes...
Phenomenology understood as a field of enquiry rather than as a movement in the history of philosophy, is concerned with the study of subjective experience and investigates the structure and nature of various types of conscious experiences. One might take collective phenomenology to be concerned with the study of group consciousness, of the subjective states of collectives qua collectives. But...
We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a failure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in particular contextual information...