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Collective Phenomenology

Elisabeth Pacherie

November 2, 2017 DOI: 10.4324/9781315768571-16 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 11
Key points Argues that the global workspace theory sheds no light on whether groups have phenomenal consciousness unless access consciousness conditions are also sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. Distinguishes group consciousness from collective experiences shared by individuals, and proposes a minimalist option in which the content and mode of singular and collective experiences remain essentially the same.

Abstract

Phenomenology understood as a field of enquiry rather than as a movement in the history of philosophy, is concerned with the study of subjective experience and investigates the structure and nature of various types of conscious experiences. One might take collective phenomenology to be concerned with the study of group consciousness, of the subjective states of collectives qua collectives. But unless one takes the conditions for access consciousness to be also sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness, the global workspace theory sheds no light on whether or not there is something it is like to be a group. Many may be skeptical as to the existence of group consciousness, but few would doubt the existence of collective experiences understood as experiences had and shared by individuals as members of some group. On a minimalist option, the content and mode of a singular and a collective experience would remain essentially the same.

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