Motor intentionality

This philosophical paper examines Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of "motor intentionality," which he introduced in Phenomenology of Perception. The author uses Merleau-Ponty's discussion as a starting point to consider how recent conceptual and empirical work can clarify what distinguishes motor intentionality from cognitive intentionality and how the two interact in normal agents. In contrast to Merleau-Ponty, the author defends a representational account of motor intentionality. The paper also addresses the challenge of explaining how motor behavior can be responsive to intentions, highlighting the interplay between motor and cognitive forms of intentionality.

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Abstract

Abstract In his book Phenomenology of Perception, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty first coined the phrase “motor intentionality.” At the same time he highlighted the contrast between motor and cognitive intentionality, he also emphasized their generally smooth interplay in normal agents. An account of motor intentionality should thus aim at elucidating not just what distinguishes motor intentionality from more cognitive forms of intentionality but also how motor intentionality relates to these more cognitive forms of intentionality. Using Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of motor intentionality as my starting point, I consider how more recent conceptual and empirical work can help sharpen our understanding of the distinctiveness of motor intentionality. In contrast to Merleau-Ponty, I defend a representational stance on motor intentionality. Finally, I turn to the challenges raised by its interplay with more cognitive forms of intentionality and the problem of explaining how our motor behavior can be responsive to our intentions.