Motor intentionality
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.19 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that motor intentionality should be understood in representational terms, contrary to Merleau-Ponty's non-representational account, while still acknowledging the importance of its interplay with cognitive intentionality. |
Abstract
Abstract In his book Phenomenology of Perception, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty first coined the phrase “motor intentionality.” At the same time he highlighted the contrast between motor and cognitive intentionality, he also emphasized their generally smooth interplay in normal agents. An account of motor intentionality should thus aim at elucidating not just what distinguishes motor intentionality from more cognitive forms of intentionality but also how motor intentionality relates to these more cognitive forms of intentionality. Using Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of motor intentionality as my starting point, I consider how more recent conceptual and empirical work can help sharpen our understanding of the distinctiveness of motor intentionality. In contrast to Merleau-Ponty, I defend a representational stance on motor intentionality. Finally, I turn to the challenges raised by its interplay with more cognitive forms of intentionality and the problem of explaining how our motor behavior can be responsive to our intentions.