1 Varieties of Naturalism
Beyond Reduction October 1, 2007 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis chapter examines varieties of naturalism in philosophy of mind and science. Naturalism holds that mental phenomena fit within the natural world as understood by the natural sciences. It takes normative and positive forms, can be a metaphysical or explanatory claim, and is based on reductive, nomic, or evolutionary paradigms for explanation. The preeminent importance of reductive naturalism in philosophy of mind is explained.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that naturalism in philosophy of mind takes normative and positive forms, can be about metaphysics or explanation, and is based on reductive, nomic, or evolutionary paradigms, with reductive naturalism being preeminently important. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter examines several varieties of “naturalism” in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. In philosophy of mind, it is the view that mental phenomena can be accommodated within the framework of the world of the nature as understood by the natural sciences. However, there are a number of variations on this view. Naturalism takes normative and positive forms. It can be a claim about metaphysics or about explanation. And it can be based on several paradigms for understanding explanation in the natural sciences: reductive, nomic, and evolutionary. The preeminent importance of reductive naturalism in philosophy of mind is explained.