Reduction and Supervenience

In contemporary philosophy of mind, several positions address whether the mind can be explained by natural science. Reductionists argue the mind is reducible to natural phenomena, while eliminativists hold that if it cannot be reduced, mentalistic concepts should be replaced with naturalistic ones. Dualists point to an explanatory gap between mind and nature, concluding the mind is not reducible and that either substance or property dualism follows. Mysterians agree the mind is irreducible but attribute this to human cognitive limitations. Nonreductive materialists reject reduction yet maintain the mind is nothing beyond natural phenomena. All these views share the assumption that intertheoretic reduction is the norm in natural sciences, which drives both reductionism and the perception of the explanatory gap as uniquely problematic.

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Abstract

AbstractThis chapter outlines the contemporary conversation in philosophy of mind. Reductionists claim the mind can or must be reducible to natural phenomena. Eliminativists claim the mind cannot be so reduced and that this implies that our mentalistic categories should be eliminated in favor of a more naturalistic vocabulary. Dualists point to an explanatory gap between mind and nature and argue that this implies the mind is not reducible to something else, and that this entails either substance or property dualism. Mysterians agree that the mind is irreducible but trace this to a limitation of our ability to understand mind‐body relations. Nonreductive materialists also reject reduction but hold that the mind is nothing over and above a set of natural phenomena. All of these views share the assumption that intertheoretic reduction is the norm in the natural sciences, and this assumption motivates both reductionism and the idea that the explanatory gap poses a unique and disturbing problem.