Consciousness Part I Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
Mind A Brief Introduction November 1, 2004 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195157338.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPhilosophy often presents apparent contradictions between two compelling but seemingly incompatible views, such as a material universe versus the existence of minds, determinism versus free will, or objective moral truth versus moral subjectivity. The author describes this pattern as typical in philosophy and notes that while some find such contradictions exasperating, others—including the author—find them fun and challenging.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that philosophy repeatedly presents apparent contradictions between compelling but incompatible views, such as materialism versus minds, determinism versus free will, and objective versus subjective moral truth. |
Abstract
Abstract We ended the last chapter with an apparent contradiction of the sort that is typical in philosophy. On the one hand we accept a view that seems overwhelmingly convincing—the universe is material—but that seems inconsistent with another view that we cannot give up—minds exist. This pattern occurs over and over in philosophy. We will see in chapter 7 that the free-will problem exhibits the same sort of conflict or contradiction: we think all events must be causally determined, but we experience freedom. In other branches of philosophy, similar inconsistencies arise. In ethics we feel there must be an objective moral truth but at the same time we feel there cannot be that kind of objectivity in morals. Some people find these contradictions in philosophy exasperating. Others, like me, find them fun and challenging.