Expectancies and the generation of perceptual experience: Predictive processing and phenomenological control

Abstract

Phenomenological control is the stable trait ability to alter subjective experience in accordance with goals. Although voluntary, phenomenological control is experienced as involuntary and has predominantly been studied within the context of hypnosis, in which direct verbal imaginative suggestions for a range of experiences are given by a designated ‘hypnotist’ (e.g., involuntary movement, paralysis, analgesia, amnesia or auditory, gustatory, tactile and visual hallucinations). However, hypnosis is not required for phenomenological control and the ability can be exercised in a variety of contexts, including in response to demand characteristics in scientific experiments. Here we trace the modern history of phenomenological control from the context of mesmerism in 18th century (which employed indirect, non-verbal suggestion) through to contemporary accounts. We focus on three theories: response expectancy theory (in which experience arises directly from expectancies), cold control theory (in which voluntary acts are experienced as involuntary due to being unaware of relevant intentions) and the predictive processing theory of hypnosis (in which voluntary acts arise from aberrant interplay of top-down predictions and bottom-up prediction error signals). We consider the pros and cons of each and explore the extent to which predictive processing might be extended to offer a full-fledged theory of phenomenological control.