Controlling phenomenology by being unaware of intentions

People vary in their ability to deliberately construct subjective experiences—such as feeling that a movement is involuntary, perceiving something that is not real, or believing something they do not actually believe—a trait called phenomenological control. These constructed experiences are accompanied by genuine neural and physiological activity. The ability works by intentionally creating a first-order mental state while maintaining a higher-order thought that one is not intending to do so. Phenomenological control can be used to demonstrate shared group values, produce hypnotic responses, or generate phenomena in psychological experiments that are suggested by demand characteristics.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter reviews evidence that people have, to a varying degree, a trait ability to control phenomenology; that is, to construct subjective experiences according to situational requirements. The experiences can be subjectively compelling ones of involuntariness (for actually intentional movements); of perceptions (that grossly misrepresent reality); and of having beliefs (that in fact one only pretends to have, e.g. being of the opposite gender). Phenomenological control produces the neural and physiological processes that underlie having the subjective experiences. We argue that phenomenological control is best understood by distinguishing first order states from higher order thoughts; in particular, phenomenological control is produced by intentionally creating the required first order states while thinking one is not so intending. Phenomenological control can be used in any context where having a subjective experience would help convince yourself and others that you share group values. It can be used in a hypnotic context to create hypnotic responses. But it can also be used in the context of psychological experiments to construct the phenomena postulated by the researcher where those phenomena are suggested by demand characteristics.