The incommensurability problem: A critique of phenomenal structuralism

Abstract

Phenomenal structuralism marks a significant shift in the study of consciousness, emphasizing the relational properties of experiential qualities rather than their intrinsic properties. This approach highlights how subjective qualities are organized and related, proposing that these structural relationships individuate such qualities within a multidimensional space. This paper focuses on the core tenets of phenomenal structuralism, particularly its commitment to holism, and the challenges it poses for comparing experiences both between and within subjects. These challenges cast serious doubt on whether similar qualitative experiences are possible across different individuals or over time. This issue is especially concerning in cases like pain, which has important ethical implications. While phenomenal structuralism successfully illuminates the relational nature of qualities, it fails to adequately account for shared aspects of qualitative experience and the possibility that different sets of qualities might lead to the same discriminations. The paper concludes by considering alternative approaches, such as representationalism, which might preserve the strengths of phenomenal structuralism without its problematic consequences. This critique calls for further investigation into how qualitative experiences can be rigorously understood without invoking intrinsic properties in mental states.