BENTHAM SCIENCE PUBLISHERS eBooks
April 7, 2011
Bruce Cutting, Alexander Kouzmin
The triadic structure of human knowing is introduced with reference to its historical roots, particularly as captured in Neo-Platonist philosophy. The hierarchical conception of the triadic structure of knowing and the significance of movements of development and regression within that hierarchy are explained. The comprehensive levels of the triadic formwork of human knowing are expounded and...
The Philosophical Quarterly
April 6, 2011
Boyd Millar
7 citations
The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which...
Journal of Undergraduate Neuroscience Education
March 15, 2011
Mathew H. Gendle
As a field, neuroscience concerns itself with gaining an understanding of how physical processes occurring in the nervous system are related to mental phenomena such as perception, motor control, and complex thoughts and behaviors. As teachers of neuroscience, we are charged with facilitating an understanding of these relationships in our students. Therefore, it seems that an in-depth...
Philosophia
March 14, 2011
David Woodruff Smith
6 citations
Pike’s phenomenology of mystical experiences articulates sharply where theological content may enter the structure of Christian mystics’ experiences (as characterized in their own words). Here we look to Buddhist (and other) accounts of “pure” or “nibbanic” consciousness attained in experiences of deep meditation. A contemporary “modal” model of inner awareness is considered whereby a form of...
Acta Psychologica
February 23, 2011
Mind-wandering: phenomenology and function as assessed with a novel experience sampling method.
arXiv Preprint Archive
February 15, 2011
A. N. Mitra, Gargi Mitra-Delmotte
preprint
Inspired by the Penrose-Hameroff thesis, we are intuitively led to examine an intriguing correspondence of 'induction' (by fields), with the complex phenomenon of (metabolism-sustained) consciousness: Did sequences of associated induction patterns in field-susceptible biomatter have simpler beginnings?
February 8, 2011
H. Schmitz, R. O. Müllan, J. Slaby
The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some...
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry
February 8, 2011
Subjective experiences and psychopathology of schizophrenia: phenomenology lost in translation?
Theoretical medicine and bioethics
February 1, 2011
Havi Carel
Phenomenology is a useful methodology for describing and ordering experience. As such, phenomenology can be specifically applied to the first person experience of illness in order to illuminate this experience and enable health care providers to enhance their understanding of it. However, this approach has been underutilized in the philosophy of medicine as well as in medical training and...
IGI Global eBooks
January 18, 2011
Roberto Poli
1 citation
The main thesis defended by this paper is the thesis of the autonomy – i.e., non-reducibility -- of the phenomenic level of analysis of the psyche. The thesis will be defended by exploiting four main ideas: (1) the theory of levels of reality, (2) the distinction between act and object of presentation, (3) the structure of internal time, and (4) the distinction between egological and non...
2011
D. Moran
Introduction The concept of habit enfolds an enormous richness and diversity of meanings. According to Husserl, habit, along with association, memory, and so on, belongs to the very essence of the psychic.1 Husserl even speaks of an overall genetic “phenomenology of habitualities”.2 In this paper, as an initial attempt to explicate the complexity of phenomenological treatments of habit, I want...
Dance Research Journal
2011
Edward C. Warburton
84 citations
One of my favorite childhood memories is from my first dance class. I ran into the studio and started jumping, jumping, jumping literally for joy when I noticed suddenly that I was not alone. There were other children in class, and they were all jumping too. We jumped together, spontaneously in sync, oblivious to what must have been looks of parental incredulity peeking through the door. The...
Journal of Aesthetic Education
2011
Eric Mullis
1 citation
Reviewed by: Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics Eric C. Mullis Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics, by Richard Shusterman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 239 pp., $20.00 paperback. One aspect of Richard Shusterman’s work is indicative of a broad movement to develop a robust philosophy of embodiment. Thinkers from diverse...
Frontiers in Psychology
2011
Jeff Yoshimi
23 citations
I show how the dynamics of consciousness can be formally derived from the "open dynamics" of neural activity, and develop a mathematical framework for neuro-phenomenological investigation. I describe the space of possible brain states, the space of possible conscious states, and a "supervenience function" linking them. I show how this framework can be used to associate phenomenological...
Reason, Spirit and the Sacral in the New Enlightenment
2011
Kathleen Haney
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s philosophy of life has been unfolding in a series of works, beginning with the her three volume work, Logos and Life. This article examines her latest work on the Sacred Quest and show how it develops out of vital life into sentient life into the Human Condition. Due to the organic nature of Tymieniecka’s work, the early stages along life’s way are described so that...