Emotions outside the box—the new phenomenology of feeling and corporeality
H. Schmitz, R. O. Müllan, J. Slaby
February 8, 2011 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9195-1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that emotions are not mental states but atmospheric phenomena in interpersonal space, rooted in the felt body. Proposes that the modern conception of the mind as a private inner realm resulted from a historical process of 'introjectionist' objectification, which impoverished lived experience. |
Abstract
The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society.
Comparable studies
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| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 9
- The Mindful Body: A Phenomenology of the Body With Multiple Sclerosis Qualitative Health Research September 10, 2018
- Feeling at one: Socio-affective distribution, vibe, and dance-music consciousness April 11, 2019
- Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 8, 2023
- Neuronormative atmospheres and the language of the pathology paradigm Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences June 17, 2026
- Embodied Consciousness and Naturalized Phenomenology Filozofska istraživanja November 23, 2017
and 4 more in the library