Merleau-Ponty Fenomenolojisi Bağlamında Bir Transhümanizm Eleştirisi
Merve Acer, Demet Konur Şen
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 12, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20138977 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that transhumanist mind uploading rests on a reductionism that severs consciousness from its lived bodily bond with the world. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and the 'cortical stack' in Altered Carbon, the author contends that the body's 'reversibility' and the 'paradox of pain' cannot be captured by digital simulation, so disembodied immortality would mean the end of the subject's intentional existence. |
Abstract
Humanity’s ancient quest for immortality has entered a new phase under modern technological determinism, evolving into a secular ‘theology of salvation’ that seeks to transcend biological limits. This paradigm views the human form as an ‘unfinished project,’ promising disembodied continuity through digital mind uploading. This article critically analyzes the ontological void created by such technological optimism through Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. The central thesis argues that positioning consciousness as an isolated ‘information set’ falls into a reductionism that severs the subject’s textural bond with the world. In this context, the ‘cortical stack’ technology in Richard K. Morgan’s Altered Carbon is analyzed not merely as a continuation of Cartesian dualism, but as a radical ontological rupture that reduces the soul from a ‘substance’ to mere digital data. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘The Flesh’ (La Chair), the research utilizes his famous mosquito example and the metaphor of the painter’s gaze to contend that the ‘reversibility’ (touching-touched) of the body cannot be reduced to a digital simulation. Furthermore, the ‘paradox of pain’ explored through virtual torture reveals that pain is not a mere signal, but a ‘tearing of the existential fabric.’ This paradox exposes transhumanism’s inescapable reliance on bodily sensation even while attempting to discard the physical self. Ultimately, the study asserts that the body is not a replaceable ‘sleeve’ but the active, meaning-generating practice of human presence. In this light, pursuing disembodied immortality represents a phenomenological death—the actual end of the subject’s intentional existence in the world.