Digital Immortality in the Context of Derek Parfit’s Reductionist Theory
Общество философия история культура May 20, 2026 DOI: 10.24158/fik.2026.4.15 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that under Parfit's logic, digital immortality requires preserving psychological continuity; non-destructive copying creates branching of personality, and digital transfer leaves qualia and moral status of digital subjects unresolved. |
Abstract
The article presents a philosophical analysis of digital immortality in the context of Derek Parfit’s reductionist theory of personal identity. The subject of the study comprises the ontological and ethical conditions under which the transfer of consciousness to a non-biological substrate can be regarded as a continuation of personal existence rather than as the creation of its copy. The aim of the study is to test the applicability of the concept of psychological continuity (Relation R) to the main scenarios of loading consciousness. The methodological basis consists of conceptual and comparative analysis, thought experiments, as well as an ethical interpretation of modern technological scenarios. It is shown that digital immortality in Derek Parfit’s logic is possible only if psychological continuity is preserved, whereas non-destructive copying creates the problem of personality branching, and transferring to a digital medium does not remove the question of the qualia and moral status of digital subjects.