Hylomorphism and Functionalism
S. Marc Cohen
Essays on Aristotle's De Anima November 9, 1995 DOI: 10.1093/019823600x.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Myles Burnyeat has not succeeded in refuting either Aristotle or the functionalist interpreters of Aristotle, countering Burnyeat's claim that a correct reading of Aristotle's philosophy of mind requires rejecting it. |
Abstract
Abstract: Myles Burnyeat, Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Cambridge University, disputes functionalist interpretations of Aristotle. Moreover, he contends that a correct understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind leads to the realization that the only thing to do with it is to reject it. This essay argues that Burnyeat has failed to refute either Aristotle or his functionalist interpreters.