Functionalism, Homunculi-Heads, and Absent Qualia
Ray Elugardo
Dialogue March 1, 1983 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217300014207 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | The paper discusses a particular objection to a specific version of functionalism about mental states, without addressing whether any version of functionalism is true. |
Abstract
It has recently become quite fashionable for one to defend a functionalist theory of mental states. However, as with most trends, functionalism has come under fire in certain philosophical quarters. In this paper, I shall not take up the question of whether any version of functionalism is true. I shall instead discuss a particular objection to a specific brand of functionalism.