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Intuition: A special kind of knowing?

D. I. Williams, Judi A. Irving

Counselling Psychology Quarterly September 1, 1996 DOI: 10.1080/09515079608258703 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 8
Key points Argues that counselling's treatment of intuition as an esoteric, mystical form of knowing contradicts phenomenological rationale. Contends that intuition is no different from other ways of making sense of the world and should be accessible to conscious understanding, and that if intuition were truly unknowable, reflective practice in counselling would not be possible.

Abstract

It is argued that while counsellors have adopted the principle tenets of phenomenology—consciousness and meaning—they have built their work on an interpretation of intuition which is contrary to phenomenological rationale and presents it as a form of knowing which is esoteric and mystical. Phenomenologically, intuition differs from no other way in which sense is made of the world. Intuitions should then, in principle, be accessible to conscious understanding so as to allow counsellors to reflect (cognitively?) on their practice. If the process of intuition were really unknowable, then reflective practice in counselling would not be possible.

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