Parallel Computation and the Mind‐Body Problem
Cognitive Science July 1, 1986 DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog1003_3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that functionalism is computationally naive because parallel computation shows software and hardware are more intertwined than functionalists allow, so hardware may matter to the mental. Contends that only further empirical investigation of mind-brain and software-hardware relations can yield a defensible solution to the mind-body problem, and that proposals casting consciousness as serial control for parallel computation are implausible. |
Abstract
The position in the philosophy of mind called functionalism claims that mental states are to be understood in terms of their functional relationships to other mental states, not in terms of their material instantiation in any particular kind of hardware. But the argument that material instantiation is irrelevant to functional relationships is computationally naive. This paper uses recent work on parallel computation to argue that software and hardware are much more intertwined than the functionalists allow. Parallelism offers qualitative as well as quantitative advantages, leading to different styles of programming as well as increased speed. Hence hardware may well matter to the mental: only by further empirical investigations of the relation between the mind and brain and between artificial intelligence software and underlying hardware will we be able to achieve a defensible solution to the mind‐body problem. The major disadvantage of parallel systems is the need to coordinate their subprocesses, but recent proposals that consciousness provides a serial control for parallel computation are implausible.