On the Solvability of the Mind–Body Problem

Consciousness is argued to be both epistemologically and ontologically emergent, meaning it cannot be fully understood or reduced to simpler physical processes. By combining emergence theory with algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment involving a basic nonlinear process, the analysis shows that emergent properties can develop in a physical system. Applied to the brain's neural network, this suggests that a reductionist understanding of consciousness is impossible. Further combinatorial analysis based on quantum mechanical limits indicates that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena, implying the mind-body problem lacks a reductionist solution.

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Abstract

The mind–body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment, employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemologically emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemologically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind–body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically emergent character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis relating to universal limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena.