Computation and the Function of Consciousness

The chapter examines three often-conflated theses about consciousness: functionalism (the mind is the brain's functional organization), the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM, the whole mind has a computational explanation), and computational functionalism (the mind is the brain's computational organization). The authors argue that functionalism does not entail CTM or computational functionalism, contrary to a common assumption. This opens an underexplored possibility: consciousness may be at least partly due to the brain's functional organization without being computational in nature, a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.