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Computation and the Function of Consciousness

G. Piccinini

November 12, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866282.003.0015 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that functionalism does not entail the Computational Theory of Mind or computational functionalism, leaving room for a noncomputational functionalist account of consciousness.

Abstract

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.