Machine understanding and the Chinese room
Philosophical Psychology 1988 DOI: 10.1080/09515088808572939 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that ambiguity in the term 'understanding' underlies the disagreement over Searle's Chinese Room argument. Proposes that understanding has formal and intentional components, that the intentional component is a functionally definable relation between a symbol and a subject's past and present states, and that a machine could bear this relation. Contends that a sketched machine possessing this component in primitive form, even if lacking consciousness and full understanding, is a counterexample to the Chinese Room argument. |
Abstract
John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of ‘understanding’. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal component. I argue that the intentional state of a symbol's being meaningful to a subject is a functionally definable relation between the symbol and certain past and present states of the subject, and that a machine could bear this relation to a symbol. I sketch a machine which could be said to possess, in primitive form, the intentional component of understanding. Even if the machine, in lacking consciousness, lacks full understanding, it contributes to a theory of understanding and constitutes a counterexample to the Chinese Room argument.