Searle's AI program
Kevin B. Korb
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence October 1, 1991 DOI: 10.1080/09528139108915295 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | Argues that Searle's Chinese room argument conflates mentality and semantics, and that separating them allows intelligence to be addressed without resolving consciousness. Proposes Harnad's symbol-grounding as a plausible route to referential semantics, concluding that Searle's objections to strong AI do not apply to real-world AI. |
Abstract
John Searle has used his Chinese room example to attack the idea of computationally reproducing intelligence. His arguments have variously assumed or (more recently) asserted that consciousness and intelligence are necessarily interdependent. This stance has allowed him to apply intuitive arguments about what could or could not be conscious to the issue of what could or could not be intelligent. I present a variety of arguments, theoretical and intuitive, to show that Searle is conflating mentality and semantics. By maintaining that distinction we can then address how to generate the semantics that intelligence requires. In Stevan Hamad's approach to symbol-grounding we have a plausible candidate for finding referential semantics without taking detours through an unanalysable consciouness. Artificial intelligence as normally construed does not require that philosophical problems about consciousness be resolved, let alone that consciousness should be computationally definable: Searle's arguments against strong AI are irrelevant to real-world AI.