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Natika W Newton

4 papers in the library · 3 citations · publishing 1988-2017

Papers

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Understanding and Self-Organization.

Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience March 2, 2017 Natika W Newton

How do we manage to understand a completely novel state of affairs, such as the sudden effects of an unexpected earthquake, or the arrival of a total stranger instead of the sister we were waiting for? In each case, for a moment we might be stunned, but we are able quite quickly to fit these events into our overall framework for understanding the world. However, terrified and despairing we...

DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2017.00008 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Self-organization Understanding Consciousness Emergence +2

The function of the cerebellum in cognition, affect and consciousness

Consciousness & Emotion December 31, 2001 Jeremy D. Schmahmann, Carl M. Anderson, Natika W Newton et al.

Editors’ note:þThese four interrelated discussions of the role of the cerebellum in coordinating emotional and higher cognitive functions developed out of a workshop presented by the four authors for the 2000 Conference of the Cognitive Science Society at the University of Pennsylvania. The four interrelated discussions explore the implications of the recent explosion of cerebellum research...

The sensorimotor theory of cognition

Pragmatics & Cognition 1993 Natika W Newton

The sensorimotor theory of cognition holds that human cognition, along with that of other animals, is determined by sensorimotor structures rather than by uniquely human linguistic structures. The theory has been offered to explain the use of bodily terminology in nonphysical contexts, and to recognize the role of experienced embodiment in cognition. This paper defends a version of the theory...

Machine understanding and the Chinese room

Philosophical Psychology 1988 Natika W Newton 3 citations

John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of ‘understanding’. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a...