A Critical Examination of Searle's Chinese Room Thought Experiment
Zhuoya Tian
Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences December 26, 2024 DOI: 10.54097/5ndhj529 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Searle's denial of machine intentionality lacks evidence and that functionalism and AI developments support the possibility of machine comprehension under certain conditions. |
Abstract
Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment argues that computers cannot understand language, but this view has been challenged from multiple perspectives. According to critics, comprehension entails a relationship to consciousness and the outside world in addition to manipulating symbols. There is little evidence to support Searle's denial of machine intentionality, and functionalism, which emphasizes the functional aspects of mental experiences, provides an alternative viewpoint. Furthermore, developments in contemporary artificial intelligence suggest that, under certain situations, machines are capable of processing information efficiently. Our knowledge of machine comprehension is changing as a result of the quick advancements in deep learning and natural language processing.. Although Searle's experiment has its limitations, it has had a lasting impact on discussions in philosophy and artificial intelligence, prompting us to reflect on the relationship between humans and machines and driving further research in this area.