(Dis)Embodiment and metaethics
Sander van Eijkern
Philosophical Explorations September 18, 2026 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2026.2730995 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that expressivism, naturalist realism, nonnaturalist realism, and error theory share a mentalistic, representationalist explanatory architecture that restricts metaethical theorizing by treating normativity as efficacious only through mental states. Proposes a non-mentalistic, non-representationalist conception of normativity as a mode of organization enacted through embodied practices, and contends that the predominant positions' architecture cannot accommodate this reorientation and that semantic reconstruction strategies do not provide an escape. |
Abstract
This paper argues that the predominant metaethical positions, namely, expressivism, naturalist realism, nonnaturalist realism, and error theory, treat normativity as explanatorily efficacious in thought and action only insofar as mental states mediate it. This reflects a mentalistic, representationalist conception of cognition and agency that restricts metaethical theorizing. To avoid this restriction, I propose a non-mentalistic and non-representationalist conception of cognition and agency that treats normativity as a mode of organization enacted through embodied practices, thereby reorienting explanations of thought and action. I argue that the explanatory architecture presupposed by the predominant positions cannot accommodate this reorientation and that semantic reconstruction strategies do not provide an escape. The paper does not develop a full-fledged alternative metaethical position. It concludes by indicating what remains to be done to extend the reorientation to account for moral normativity and moral phenomenology.